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FOREWORD
The strategic quality of Landpower is widely
known, but not widely understood. In this monograph,
Dr. Colin S. Gray explores and explains the meaning
of strategic Landpower. He is concerned particularly
to argue that, although Landpower today must function in a joint environment, typically it is the dominant
element in the team for U.S. national security.
The monograph lays emphasis upon the place
of the human domain that leads in the role played
by ground forces in strategy. Because of some widespread conceptual misuse, many people are not used
to thinking of Landpower as a strategic instrument for
American security policy. Dr. Gray aspires to help reduce the popularity of this important misconception.
It is necessary for good policy that American Landpower should be considered and debated properly,
which is to say in appropriate strategic terms.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
American Landpower is a strategic instrument of
state policy and needs to be considered as such. The
purpose of this monograph is to explore and explain
the nature of Landpower, both in general terms and
also with particular regard to the American case. Five
themes drive through this work. Specifically, it is argued that: (1) Landpower is unique in the character
of the quality it brings to the American joint team for
national security; (2) the United States has a permanent need for the human quality in Landpower that
this element provides inherently; (3) Landpower is
always and indeed necessarily strategic in its meaning and implications—it is a quintessentially strategic
instrument of state policy and politics; (4) strategic
Landpower is unavoidably and beneficially joint in its
functioning, and this simply is so much the contemporary character of American strategic Landpower that
we should consider jointness integral to its permanent
nature; and, (5) notwithstanding the nuclear context
since 1945, Landpower retained, indeed retains, most
of the strategic utility it has possessed through all of
history: this is a prudent judgment resting empirically
on the evidence of 70 years’ experience.
In short, the strategic Landpower maintained today can safely be assumed to be necessary for security
long into the future. No matter how familiar the concept of strategic Landpower is when identified and expressed thus, it is a physical and psychological reality
that has persisted to strategic effect through all of the
strategic history to which we have access.
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ALWAYS STRATEGIC:
JOINTLY ESSENTIAL LANDPOWER
As we relearned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United
States should not enter a conflict with a strategic plan
that amounts to little more than engaging and destroying the enemy order of battle. Lasting strategic success
is not a function of enemy units eliminated or targets
destroyed. A successful strategic outcome rests, as it
has since time immemorial, on winning the contest
of wills.
		
		
		

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN 1

As this nation goes forward into a new century one
thing remains certain; Landpower will remain central
to our strategic success. There is no more unmistakable
or unambiguous display of American resolve than the
highly visible deployment of Landpower.
		
		
		

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN2

Land operations have a uniquely significant role, in
both peacetime and conflict, in addressing human factors. This assertion arises from the recognition that: 1)
the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces significantly contribute to the activities central to
influencing the “human domain” short of war, such as
peacekeeping, comprehensive military engagement,
security force assistance, building partner capacity,
and stability operations; 2) in conflict, the same forces
are those most intimately and closely involved with
the human networks—friendly, enemy, and neutral—
that comprise the “human domain,” and 3) strategic
success most often occurs within the land domain,
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especially in the shared space between humans and
the land, and potentially in the shared space between
humans and the cyberspace domain.
		
		
		

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
General James F. Amos, USMC, and
Admiral William H. McRaven, USN3

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Geography is not joint, but warfare has become
ever more noticeably so over the course of the past
century. That said, even conceded, the idea of Landpower should be clear enough, although it assuredly
is not beyond all frontier types of conceptual challenge. My subject is neither confused nor should it be
at all confusing, unless, that is, one chooses to make it
so. Although there are libraries crammed with studies
of warfare on land, writings addressed explicitly and
more or less discretely to exploration and explanation of Landpower are not in abundant supply. One
explanation for thinness in the literature simply is that
few gifted scholars have felt moved to explain what
they believe is already common knowledge because it
is or ought to be obvious. Landpower is both an empirically verifiable reality and also a conceptual construction. The need for reliable joint cooperative military effort renders the idea of Landpower apparently
vulnerable to some erosion of the right to exclusive
ownership and command. The constructivist categorization that may seem able to divide up the world
into distinctive geographical domains can appear
troublingly vulnerable to the political, strategic, and
budgetary consequences of technological innovation.
When one geographical domain cannot effectively
2

resist functionally enabling assistance from capabilities designed primarily to exploit other geographies,
understandably and predictably interservice rivalries
are fostered and may fester. Common sense tends to
be an early casualty in the politics of interdomainal
military procurement and influence. This monograph
has no wish to add fuel to any conflagration enabled
by the military, for strategic nonexclusivity in Army
competence and authority.
This discussion of strategic Landpower cannot
avoid the necessity of identifying a true partnership
of the “both and” kind. To be specific, Landpower is
both essential for American national security and yet
must depend critically upon the strategically enabling
potential of other military domains. The somewhat
uncomfortable dualism just expressed is generically
all too familiar in a subject such as this that appears
to make a mockery of distinctive hierarchy in relationships. For the reasons argued subsequently, Landpower unquestionably must be regarded as the premier
category of military capability, but several caveats require recognition as potentially substantial hazards to
the safety of the logic of the Landpower case. One notable contemporary reason why Landpower lacks sovereign strategic authority is because its effectiveness in
deterrence or in combat action could be negated were
the United States to be obliged to resort to large-scale
nuclear use with a similarly nuclear armed enemy.
It is true to claim that one might endeavor to define
strategic Landpower in a way so highly permissive as
to include the means of nuclear bombardment. However, a bid for such inclusivity in favor of Landpower
plainly would not be culturally consistent with now
traditional American habits of mind and organization
concurring military categorization.4 Russians may

3

well view their long-range nuclear-tipped and landbased missile forces essentially as artillery, but Americans do not and are unlikely to follow suit. However,
strange to say, perhaps, the obvious potential menace
posed by nuclear weapons to any verdict on combat
by conventional Landpower does not serve greatly to
demote the relative significance of the Army. It is necessary to appreciate the significance of commonsense
boundaries to strategic argument. The case for strategic premiership that is the Army’s does not need to
rest upon implausible, or worse, arguments claiming
an ability to wage any or all combat of any character.
To be assessed as critically important, there is no need
for Landpower to make implausible acquisitive grabs
in a hunt for the ability to cope sufficiently well with
any and all categories of challenge.5
It is important to recognize that the high concept
of strategic Landpower is essential both for what it
includes and what it does not. Indeed, the integrity
of the concept and the category of capability and implied behavior to which it refers, require clear enough
boundaries if they are to function usefully. Although
seapower, airpower, and now cyberpower, plainly can
be regarded not unfairly as strategic categories that
inherently are variably competitive with Landpower,
also their legitimate distinctiveness is essential for the
generic-like distinctiveness of Landpower. Indeed,
given the cumulative accretion of military capabilities with domainal ancestry other than of a landward
nature, it is vitally necessary for the conceptual and
practical organizational integrity of Landpower that
the frontiers demarcating seapower and airpower, for
examples, are maintained meaningfully.6
The validity of the concept of Landpower is evidenced convincingly by facts “in the field.” Although
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Landpower is a conceptual construction, it does have
historically verifiable empirical markers. Most empires are troubled by some residual persisting uncertainty over the proper frontier of their domains.
It is only sensible to recognize that Landpower is a
concept that can be interpreted in a way uncomfortably permissive of opportunistic seizure by military
organizations whose primary focus is not the land. In
truth, historical circumstance, military and strategic
culture, and even individual personality, can play a
role in the determination of what is and what is not
regarded locally as Landpower.
For reasons readily attributable largely to their
geography and historical experience, particularly as
those potent sources of influence are mediated by culture, many countries have never been in serious danger
of being uncertain about the relative seniority granted
officially and popularly to their geographically distinctive armed forces. For particularly clear examples,
Britain has long regarded its Royal Navy as the Senior
Service, while Russia and Germany have never been
in serious peril of misunderstanding the ever arguably
“luxury” nature of their episodically impressive naval
power.7 Monarchical and then Imperial France periodically was proved persuadable that its greatness both
required and could secure preeminence at sea as well
as on land, but typically that belief, or one should say
hope, was not well enough founded. The strategic frontier of France was on or about the Rhine, which had to
mean that strategic Landpower needed to be the core
of concern for French statecraft and strategy. Britain
learned in the 17th century to distrust Landpower in
the form of a standing army, which meant that it could
make a virtue of the strategic necessity of its insularity for the achievement and sustenance of maritime
preponderance.
5

The American case has been a mixed one that tracks
recognizably with the broad influences of national
geography and historical circumstance mentioned
earlier. Although American Landpower, inclusively
understood, was episodically briefly and deeply impressive in the early-1860s and the late-1910s for obvious reasons of wartime mobilization, there is no doubt
that it cannot properly be assessed as being even somewhat equal in national cultural esteem to the military
power and systems of Prussia/Germany and Russia.
The physical and political geography of America prior
to the construction of the Panama Canal in 1914, and
the transoceanic immigrant origins of many Americans, meant rather ironically that the truly continental
scale of the mature national geography was more than
marginally offset in popular appreciation by the practical difficulty of transcontinental mobility. The relatively high national security that geographical insularity on a continental scale provided came naturally
at a notable and politically contestable strategic price.
Obviously enough, while American Landpower could
and periodically did trouble Canadian and Mexican
neighbors in North America, continental insularity
also meant that the United States lacked easy access to
the principal areas of world contention in and about
Eurasia.8 In short, when the United States decided that
it should intervene strategically in a forceful manner
in world affairs, it found that command of the sea
(and forward bases) across oceanic distances to Europe (and Africa) and Asia was absolutely essential. In
addition, in the 1940s, the aerial domain also needed
to be commanded before American Landpower could
be brought into contact with the enemies of the day.
Contrary to appearances, perhaps, it is not my
intention here to challenge the core ideas expressed
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so clearly by Generals Raymond Odierno and James
Amos and Admiral William McRaven in the epigraphs to this monograph. Rather, I seek to emphasize the distinctiveness, indeed the uniqueness, of
the American strategic historical experience. American Landpower has been no less strategic than were
German and Russian/Soviet Landpower, but its historical manifestation was nationally different, albeit
not conceptually in kind. The strategic meaning of
Landpower is the same among states, but geography
and history provide individual national contexts for
strategic meaning.
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER
At present, the Army chooses to define Landpower as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to
gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources,
and people.”9 There is much to recommend in this
definition, given its privileging of the idea of control.
An admirable vigor pervades the definition, while
there is also room for some discretion on the boundary. It may be noticed that, although Landpower is
discussed widely almost as a team player alongside
other categories of power differentiated by geography or function, there is a sense in which it should be
regarded as a primus inter pares (first among equals).
The Army is not confused about this, but alignment
in a common categorization as power, albeit duly
modified to fit particular geography (e.g., seapower
and airpower), can encourage misunderstanding. If
anything, the very concept of Landpower, which unavoidably and indeed necessarily, privileges physical
geography, somewhat undermines appreciation of its
own full and true case. There is some danger of the
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Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces
inadvertently diminishing the weight of their argument as a consequence of their combined effort to
promote Landpower. The official definition quoted at
the beginning of this section is good in that its nonspecificity regarding military means allows for useful
inclusion of a wide discretion. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the broad geographical categorization,
there does remain a somewhat inappropriate implicit
commonality. In other words, Landpower appears to
be regarded as another geographically identified category, more than marginally comparable to the sea and
the air. Landpower risks under appreciation because
of the comparability with the sea, air, and now cyber
as well, that appears to be suggested by its name as an
adjectival modifier of the concept of power.
It has been my first-hand experience for nearly 50
years as a teacher and author on strategy, that it can be
challenging to accord Landpower the quality of recognition it merits, because so often it is presented in the
historical and conceptual company of other apparently more than marginally like ideas, such as seapower,
airpower, and cyberpower. For obvious, and indeed
all but self-evident reasons with admirably joint connection, it can be difficult for the Landpower triad of
Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces to be frank,
yet also fair as well as honest.
What needs to be gripped and grasped beyond
room for argument is the permanent geographical fact
which is an enduring practical reality for strategy—
that the land matters most for humans. Indeed, we
have no geographical choice. The other geographical
environments, including the constructed ones now
composed of cyberspace, and the functionally awesome domain of nuclear weapons, can be important,
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occasionally indeed even conclusively so. But the
consequences of threat and action in all geographical
contexts ultimately must have strategic and political
meaning for and on land. This is hardly news, but
exciting analyses pertaining to actual and potential
conflict at sea, in the air, in cyberspace, and even concerning the political efforts of nuclear threat, all, finally and determinatively, have meaning for the land
and Landpower. This is a matter of nature, but it is a
fundamental truth of our human condition that can
be hard to find if the distinctive geographies of our
whole context are not appreciated correctly.
To claim that the land always matters most because
it is the only physical geography that we can inhabit
is not to claim, save in a formal sense, that all human
conflict must be decided as a direct consequence of
happenings on land. However, given that we humans
can organize our security only for where we are able
to live, on land, it has to follow that extraterritorial
behavior needs translation as to its meaning for the
strategic narrative on land. In common with physical
geography, strategic history inherently is more than
joint; it is a unified, at least a collective, whole, albeit
sometimes confusing and untidy, as well as incomplete.10 Strategic history may well appear to repeat
itself in parallel narratives, even if, more likely when,
the paths of causation contributing to events are notably different. Overall, however, strategic threat,
anxiety, and action, no matter the particular military
forms taken at the time, have to be expressed recognizably in political and strategic terms readily explicable with reference to an inclusive understanding of
Landpower.
I have argued elsewhere that the most potent question in the methodological arsenal of the strategist is
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the challenging, and sometimes even offensive appearing, demand for understanding carried by the elementary query, “So what?”11 Given that we can only
inhabit and politically organize the land, it must follow that all strategic behavior judged relevant to our
situation has to bear upon our Landpower, certainly
as this concept currently is officially defined.
The Army’s (et al.) definition of Landpower is a
permissive one, particularly given the broad inclusivity allowed by the focus upon a desired consequence
of American behavior—control. Since it is an eternal
truth that we cannot inhabit nonterritorial geography,
it has to be the case that military forces of all kinds
ultimately can be challenged by the basic, deceptively
simple seeming, question deployed earlier. Whether
or not ground forces are heavily involved, the single
strategic historical narrative that is our human estate
should be understandable as Landpower. The other
geographical environments may well be militarily,
strategically, and then consequentially politically,
episodically more important than U.S. land—as in
ground—power. But, the single and unified narrative
of American strategic history must show effect in or
for Landpower. Properly comprehended, as in intelligent understanding of the currently official definition of Landpower, there is no strict requirement for
strategic Landpower to be delivered by ground forces.
The geopolitical and therefore also the geostrategic
context for American international behavior is nearly
always about the acquisition of influence at a transoceanic distance. It follows that there can be no doubting the strategic necessity for substantial supporting,
and occasionally even substitutional, effort on the part
of military agents other than ground forces. Strategic
Landpower must be a heavily and diversely joint en-
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terprise. U.S. ground forces always require military
cover and other kinds of support from friendly air assets, much of which in transportation and bombardment roles will need to be of medium and long range.
Similarly, the absolute necessity for aerial support
is paralleled by the necessity of transoceanic logistic
provision, which for purposes other than brief raids
still has to be transported by sea.
The core of the strategic argument for the U.S. Army,
Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces is borne
by the powerful concept of control.12 These forces,
though primarily the Army, inherently have qualities
with high potential strategic value unique and indispensable to the nation. These qualities should be well
known, but still there is a plausible case to be made for
emphasizing their extraordinary relative importance.
It is necessary to differentiate between general and
contextually particular truths. Bearing in mind that we
are investigating and explaining two heavily interconnected, but nonetheless distinctive, ideas—American
strategic Landpower on the one hand, and American
ground forces on the other—it soon becomes quite
apparent why this vital distinction is simultaneously
both important yet ultimately rather trivial in strategic
and ultimately political assessment. What follows is
a shortlist of ideas that serve to capture most of what
needs to be caught in the particular conceptual web
that is the prime focus of this monograph.
SOME PRE-THEORY ON STRATEGIC
LANDPOWER
1. The case for the strategic relevance of Landpower must vary enormously with the scale and particular
character of each individual conflict. Also, given that
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the character of future conflict is not reliably predictable, the United States requires of its Landpower that
it should be ready enough for overseas deployment
on relatively short notice. Obviously, the scale of the
problem(s) must largely determine the lead-time required to ready forces for deployment that may have
to be of protracted duration.
2. The unpredictability of policy demand for actions
by Landpower, and the variety of possible geopolitical and geostrategic contexts, mean that the American
approach to strategic Landpower needs to be considerably inclusive. The immediate roles required to be
played by U.S. ground forces may be modest. Indeed,
it is probable that in many cases the bare fact of their
commitment and deployment may well be more significant strategically and politically than is their anticipated tactical effectiveness.
3. “Boots on the ground” carry, or at least imply,
a quality of American desire or demand for political
control of behavior locally that cannot credibly and effectively be borne by other kinds of military power.
Air and missile power certainly can achieve control,
indeed, the entire theory, policy, and strategy of nuclear deterrence rests on this belief. However, the quality
of behavioral control that ground forces can secure is
unique. The presence of those forces carry a message
of reassurance or of potentially coercive menace that
may be up close and even personal.
Also, the local deployment of ground forces typically requires a quality of local social and cultural engagement that can be strategically vital for American
understanding; such engagement cannot be achieved
from altitude or at sea. Needless to say, the potential
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benefits of a Landpower—as ground power—commitment have to be assessed in balance with its distinctive hazards. However, the danger and cost involved
in being strangers in a strange land, foreigners amid
an alien culture, today are quite well understood.13
Nonetheless, it remains true to say that there is a quality of political and even cultural commitment inherent
in the forward deployment of American ground forces that is not, and cannot be, replicated by other kinds
of action, almost regardless of the relative strength in
their strategic promise. It must be said that many of
the tough lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are
likely to age and perish in the 2010s, now that counterinsurgency (COIN) has lost its political, strategic,
and military attractions for a while that may last for
10 or 20 years. Although COIN certainly is, indeed
ought to be, the most engaging of contact behavior
in the human domain, it does not follow that our recent protracted COIN experience should be regarded
definitively as the field test for the strategic utility of
American Landpower.
4. It should never be forgotten that strategic force
is military force considered and assessed for its political consequences. Awesome and possibly shocking
though destruction may be when delivered from a
considerable distance, one is bound to say that U.S.
Navy Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie was definitely persuasive when he wrote:
The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the
scene with the gun. This man is the final power in
war. He is Control. He determines who wins. There
are those who would dispute this as an absolute,
but it is my belief that while other means may critically influence war today, after whatever devastation
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and destruction may be inflicted on an enemy, if the
strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is
the soldier.14

Wylie’s advice is not a magical elixir for ensuring
that military success will be succeeded by strategic
benefit. Not infrequently, people forget that strategic
history is always flowing in a great stream of time,
and that military victory or advantage may not result
in the benign political effect that one might carelessly
assume to be authoritative.15 The point needing emphasis here, properly assisted by the wise Rear Admiral, is that strategic effect has to be measured in its, political consequences. The reason why this must be so
is because it is only policy, expressing political wishes,
that can justify and legitimize the threat or use of strategic Landpower. The nexus between policy and strategy often is considerably closer than some scholars
and many citizens assume to be the case. The austere
basic elements of the theory of strategy that usually
is taught in institutions of higher military education,
typically distinguish clearly between strategy’s military ways and its political purposes.16 But, frequently
in practice this can prove to be a notionally clear distinction that is not allowed to provide much by way
of helpful guidance over practice.17 Plainly, the potent
and attractively inclusive concept of strategic Landpower requires considerable care in its handling, since
it brushes, at the very least, against the policy/politics
“box” in a PowerPoint slide. This troubling thought
now must be considered critically and rigorously if
we are to be confident that the conceptual dimension
to this analysis does not pose a lethal menace that can-
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not be overcome at tolerable cost to the authority that
should be allowed to the idea of strategic Landpower.
It is perhaps ironic that such an almost self-evidently useful concept as strategic Landpower should
be as vulnerable to ill-considered doubt as it is. This
may be a case not unlike that made for genius in
war, to the effect that unquestionably extraordinary
talent in command tends to be balanced more than
somewhat by unattractive personal characteristics.
The concept of strategic Landpower has high merit
both as theory and in its practical implications. But,
there is trouble both with the modifying and defining
adjective and with the noun itself. The fact that this
trouble is not well founded does not suffice to cancel
criticism. In part, the criticism is avoidable, but also
in quite good part, it refers to professional matters
that are largely discretionary and therefore inherently
more than marginally political in an inclusive sense. I
need to be unambiguous as to the meaning of leading
concepts and descriptors. Most especially, there is a
necessity for clarity of meaning, as well as proper use,
of principal terms. To those ends, I will explain the
meaning of strategic and of Landpower. Many expert
defense professionals may well differ from me on my
explanations: so be it.
Strategic.
Strategic, the adjective, is misused very widely in
its attribution to particular kinds of military forces
because of their inherent nature or their presumed
potential significance. This is simply wrong. Indeed,
it is more than just wrong because it is a conceptual
error that has harmful consequences for defense and
war planning. In truth and pragmatically, all military
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forces, be they great or small in number and assignments, are latently, residually, strategic. Strategy is
not effected by inherently strategic acts, but rather by
the consequences of tactical and operational level behavior. Those consequences must vary hugely in relative (consequentially strategic) weight from situation
to situation. To designate some kinds of forces clearly
either as strategic or tactical is a cardinal error in military theory; the fact that states have made this mistake
for several generations now does not miraculously expunge the error. Strategy is all about the consequences
of tactical behavior. It should not be particularly difficult to understand why it is crucially important to the
quality in policy for the military instrument and its
behavior to be assessable in terms of the consequences of its actions. If one confuses the intended doing
of strategy with tactical practice, then it will not be
surprising if one is lost in a no-man’s land of confusion. What one would be saying would be that there
are strategic, as contrasted with tactical, objectives (or
targets, or forces). Strategic does not mean inherently
nuclear, long-range, or even exceptionally important.
The fact that the “strategic” adjective is so profusely, and indeed officially misused, does not somehow render it correct, or even just right enough. To
summarize pointedly, the U.S. Army, by proper definition, inherently is a strategic instrument. By this, I
mean that its potential and actual behavior must have
influence, great or small upon the course of strategic
history. The Army does not have some strategic, as
may be differentiated from tactical, tasks, because that
distinction is logically and practicably erroneous. This
essential point was made most clearly by Dr. Antulio
Echevarria when he explained that “all events in war
have weight; even the least can have disproportionate
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effects.”18 Strategy consists of the consequences of tactical behavior. There are no lesser “tactical” duties. In
order to grasp fully the meaning and implications of
this elementary binary distinction, all that one needs
do is to simplify the challenge as being in essence a
distinction between cause and consequence. I appreciate that, when the tactical behavior in question
appears very slight in the total context and narrative
of national military effort, it will be difficult to accept
as legitimate the idea that the modest scale of action
under consideration nonetheless has some slight strategic meaning. The concept of strategic Landpower
is intellectually healthy when it can be regarded as a
philosophical and theoretical step in the right direction, though I must confess to being dismayed by the
apparent need for the redundancy, since Landpower
cannot possibly be other than strategic in its potential,
let alone in practice.
Landpower.
Strategy can be problematic both in its design and
in its practice when the politics that contribute massively to policy function to create effectively a collectivity of effort toward national security. Landpower
can be rendered conceptually and then practicably
uncertain for reason of an erosion of distinctiveness.
I am troubled about the official definition of Landpower by analogy with the same reason that a thoroughly welcoming ecumenical approach to religion
has the potential to dilute the core of what I may believe to be the truth. There is not a real problem here
over the integrity of this concept of Landpower, but
the Army should scarcely need to be advisedly prudent concerning the need to accommodate potentially
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contributing agents from other sovereign domains
of strategic endeavor. It is appropriate to recognize
and welcome jointly helpful assistance to the Army’s
predominant Landpower on the part of the navy,
air, space, and cyber—not to mention significantly
the contribution by way of intrawar deterrence that
nuclear armed forces may supply. But it is likely to
be deemed important that the most formally licensed
contributors to American Landpower should not imperil their military strategic leadership position. It can
be challenging to discuss this aspect of the subject because authentically unified strategic argument about
what is best for national security can hardly help but
be brushed with some of the less wholesome features
of inter- and even intraservice politics. Of course, it is
only natural for contenders to play hard in support of
their home team, but that team may be a geographically distinctive armed service, or a functionally separate
element thereof, as contrasted with an entire national
strategic effort.
In principle, the Landpower concept is not eroded
and possibly diluted by high inclusivity of definition.
However, Landpower in practice, which most essentially has to mean land control, can be vulnerable to
actual as well as potential weakening by diffusion, as
the control function is performed by military agents
less committed to the core task of land and population
control.19 It is advisable that a state’s army should be
reluctant to shed many arguably specialist tasks as a
consequence of political pressure, let alone joint good
will. One needs to be cautious in explaining the reasons for such restraint in enthusiasm for joint endeavor. Fundamentally, the reason is because of the strong
advisability of prudence in performance of the core
Landpower mission. The essence of Landpower duty
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is control of a particular land area, territory, and what
is on it for as long as policy requires. To fulfill this
mission, protracted engagement may be necessary,
possibly entailing some co-existence, if not necessarily
cooperation, with a local population whose political
sympathies and leanings cannot be assumed always
to be friendly.
It should not be forgotten that what makes Landpower strategic are the consequences of its behavior.
There are many diverse ways in which a state can attempt to secure political influence where it most matters in the hearts, but probably more reliably in the
minds of adversaries or those currently politically
uncommitted. But, undoubtedly there is a uniquely
persuasive (and coercive) quality to the local presence
of the man on “the scene with the gun,” to employ
Wylie’s telling phrase yet again. It is important that
Americans should resist strategic capture by what
can be made to appear as attractive alternatives to
strategic Landpower. The leading attractions of most
relevance here are budgetary economy and a greater
prudence in political commitment. In other words,
it is usual for there to be several alternative strategic
ways in which political ends might be sought. It is
important to recognize that the historical contextual
reality almost always seems compatible with at least
a shortlist of possibly appropriate alternative strategic
approaches. That said, perhaps conceded, it is scarcely
less significant for American policy to understand fully the nature of strategic Landpower and the reasons
for that nature.
Strategic Landpower at its core comprises the
ground combat forces of the state. In theory at least,
recognition of strategic jointness should not confuse
or mislead. What matters most for the discussion
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here is that the geo-strategically unique context of
war, certainly of conflict, should be fully and accurately understood. No matter how great or small may
need to be the assistance to, and support of, American land combat forces by other forces at and from
the sea, the air, in space, and in cyberspace, such help
will be needed. It is my contention that Landpower
with the tactical character of forces built and trained
to conduct ground warfare in its several forms must
remain and be regarded authoritatively as essential.
What is unique about military Landpower is its ability
to persist in contested territory in the quest for control. Of course, the measure of control sought over
adversarial behavior may not always be attainable at
a cost the American political system finds tolerable,
given the contemporary definition of national interest.
But, the case for strategic Landpower cannot rest upon
confident expectation of prudence in the policy that
American politics determines.
The “strategic” in the concept of strategic Landpower must rest in practice on the quality of values
and assessments that are made. However, there is and
can be nothing in the strategic Landpower concept itself that guarantees against misuse or even just bad
luck. The value of this concept lies most essentially in
its direction of attention to the overarching mission of
control of land and what and who is on it. If the concept of strategic Landpower is deemed unduly inclusive, too permissive of assistance by ancillary military
(et al.) agents other than ground combat and combat
support forces, then it may be necessary to substitute
a more exclusive official understanding of Landpower
for the current one. Attractive though it certainly is
in its corralling of any and all sources of influence
over happenings on the ground, there is little doubt
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that the concept in probable effect comprises a charter for possible dilution of effort. When interpreted
with good will, intelligently regarding the occasional
peril in ill-conceived or clumsily executed “jointery,”
there is no significant cause for alarm. However, conceptual formulae with unpoliced frontiers are likely
to promote interservice and interfunctional strife that
would be strategically unhelpful. Today’s concept of
strategic Landpower is vitally important to the Army,
Marine Corps, and Special Forces, but it could benefit
from some enhanced clarity as to the unique strategic
purpose of military Landpower.
WHY STRATEGIC LANDPOWER IS UNIQUE?
WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT IT?
In order to understand fully Landpower, it is essential to grasp what is unique about it. Indeed, the
differences in nature, not only in character, from other
geographically distinguishable domains should be
so obvious as to be in little need of identification, let
alone emphasis here. Nonetheless, there is a shortage
of full and proper appreciation of Landpower relative
to military power designed to function in and from
the other geographies.
I will make a modest effort to explain just why
Landpower is and has to be of prime strategic importance. However, the argument here would be defeated
in grisly strategic practice were nuclear deterrence to
suffer a brief lapse at the wrong moment in super and
great power relations. There is an extremely potent
and persuasive case to be made on behalf of Landpower, but it does have limits. Unless one were to attempt to accept an extreme liberality of inclusiveness,
it is neither relevant nor helpful to attempt to stretch
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conceptually the Landpower domain so as to render it
as embracing nuclear-armed forces of intercontinental
range. In other words, although Landpower would
be a vitally significant participant in any conflict process that might be concluded with nuclear warfare
conducted on a large scale, once a substantial nuclear
“exchange” was either imminent or actually extant in
process, Landpower most likely would lose relative
significance. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to
argue that the bilateral conduct of nuclear warfare on
a large scale probably would render the prosecution
of further strategic efforts problematic in the extreme.
If this is granted as a strong probability, the strategic
quality of Landpower could well prove of little importance. Large-scale nuclear employment certainly is
a relevant concern for theorists (and practitioners) of
strategic Landpower, but it is one that need not, and
hence should not, hinder progress in this analysis. I
choose not to allow the hopefully distant possibility of
a large scale American nuclear exchange either with
Russia or China to obstruct the path toward proper
understanding of strategic Landpower. It is sufficient
for our purpose here simply to note the grim but most
likely rather distant prospect of nuclear warfare and
move on. This is a classic “What if . . .” of future strategic history that cannot be permitted to control and
thereby shape our understanding of today and tomorrow. What follows in this section is written unavoidably in the knowledge of nuclear possibilities, but such
happenings are judged to reside in the mercifully bare
short list of game-changing possibilities that ought
not to detain attention further in this monograph.
The question of greatest moment for analysis and
explanation here is the one posed in the title to this
section: rephrased a little from the section title, we
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must ask “What is different about strategic Landpower; how and why is it unique?”
The Land Matters Most.
We are a species able to live only upon the land.
This means that all our cultural, economic, political,
and strategic business has to be conducted with territorial reference and context. Even global maritime
trade makes sense only with reference to its territorial
origins and destination. Maritime logistics are essential to globalization, but that is solely a transportation
narrative; the demand and the supply both require territorial definition. It is all too commonplace for writers
today to be so bedazzled by contemporary diversity
in logistics, and by the sheer variety of adaptive geographical exploitation expressed in military arsenals,
that the enduring most senior significance of territoriality appears to be lost. The character of commerce
and of warfare is ever changing, but we have been,
and must remain, land animals. It has to follow that
political organizations and their military agents must
understand security concerns and anxieties ultimately
and unavoidably in territorial terms; and those terms
always need relation to safety in and of the political
home, the homeland, which is a most telling concept
in its implications.
Landpower Is about Proximity for Control.
From time to time, the United States asks more of
its armed forces than the securing of some influence
over foreign decisionmaking. In addition, what is required is a physical control that possibly, indeed probably, will have to be achieved coercively. It is relative-
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ly rare for us to need the ability to control behavior in
this nonpermissive way, but it does occur. There are
threats as well as actual violent behavior that must be
opposed, stopped, and even punished. While plainly
hostile behavior certainly can be harassed and possibly halted by a wide variety of measures, the quality
of control achievable by the “man on the scene with
the gun” has a definitive quality unmatchable by other
agencies. This is not to suggest that the local presence
of Landpower itself can resolve political problems
that may also be significantly cultural, but the local
and potentially enduring presence of our soldiers assuredly alters the local context within which new decisions by foreign agencies will have to be made.
The virtual occupation of foreign lands by means
of menace (and more) from altitude, or from over the
horizon at sea, is not the strategic or moral equivalent
to the occupation, if necessary the seizure, of foreign
territory, and presence in the closest of proximity to
foreign nationals. The down-side to the proximity and
human contact achieved by a Landpower presence is
too obvious to need much comment here. Obviously,
it can be difficult in the extreme for the United States
to distinguish between a local presence and possibly
military (and policing for public order) effort that is
sufficient, and one that is too much. It is a problem
endemic in warfare that, notwithstanding rather naively optimistic theory and policy that was authoritative through most of the 1960s, competitive effort in a
violent conflict cannot be controlled predictably and
reliably. At least this is true if we are determined to
prevail strategically and politically.20
In summation, the dynamics of a conflict can begin
to take the lead over policy and its politics, meaning
that the former will serve the latter, rather than vice
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versa, as should be the case. Plainly, the high potential strategic value of a local deployment of American Landpower is likely to stimulate—for a while, at
least—greater effort on the part of local opposition.
What is certain is that the forward deployment of this
Landpower will raise the political stakes significantly for an administration with American voters (and
parents and other loved ones). This high quality of
personal political commitment will be both of almost
inestimable positive value for the quality of American
political commitment, but also inevitably will comprise a major creation of policy-political vulnerability.
All countries care more about the safety of their own
soldiers than they do about casualties among foreigners, including allies. This is inevitable and indeed
usually quite proper. It is exactly the very quality of
care felt by Americans about the forward deployment
into probable military action of their soldiers that renders strategic Landpower so potent a commitment,
stamped though it is, and indeed should be, with
acute policy concerns on the domestic front.21
Strategic Landpower and the Importance
of the Human Domain.
The grand concept of strategic Landpower can appear so elevated and abstract that it appears to resist
understanding in human terms. General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, went some way, possibly even
too far, toward proper appreciation of the individual
human contribution to great enterprises of state with
his idea of the “strategic corporal.”22 To many commentators, this concept seemed extravagant: after all,
what could be the strategic meaning of behavior by a
corporal? Surely strategy was discussed and decided
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by people of high rank. In fact, as noted already in this
monograph, corporals do strategy—they have some
strategic effect whether or not they are aware of it at
the time or even in some retrospect. Although strategy
certainly is designed, decided, and implemented as
direction at a high level of command, as, if not more,
important is the fact that strategy actually is done in
the only zone of behavior possible, which is the tactical. Strategy bereft of tactics and operations essentially is meaningless aspiration. Strategy and its strategist
author conceive and plan what will be attempted, and
it may well be sensible to extend the idea of strategy
so as to include command.23 However, the strategist
as conceptualizer, planner, and commander is envisaging the consequences of his adversarial direction of
tactical and operational performances. The entire process that results in strategically significant behavior is
inherently and essentially human. Landpower really
is about soldiers. They are supported and enabled to
be effective by particular technologies and logistics,
but they do not “serve” equipment, rather the equipment serves them. The technical performance of machinery is of the highest relative importance to military professionals who must perform their duty at sea,
in the air, and in cyberspace. The landward domain, in
contrast, finds military equipment both essential and
important, but not usually critically so.
The key reason why the land domain is unique and
different is because so much of significance that occurs on it is subject to human discretion. A critically
important enabler of this human discretion is the rich
variety of geography—human and natural—and the
wide scope of possibilities that render thought and
behavior difficult to predict, given the pertinent opportunities and hindrances. Of course, there are moral

26

qualities common in importance across domains;
courage, determination, fortitude, integrity, honesty,
and so forth. However, the geo-physics of the domains other than the land that require extremes of dependence upon the competitive quality of technology
(e.g., ships, aircraft, and computers), routinely need to
ask less of the military personnel committed to their
use and exploitation than do the forces that express
and perform as strategic Landpower. The abstraction
that is the concept of Landpower always descends in
practice to the behavior of people in uniform, no matter how technologically advanced their equipment.
The historical record shows that troops require
armament good enough or sufficiently adaptable to
meet the demands of their tactical and operational requirements. Superior technology may be exploited in
order to secure tactical advantage, but only rarely is a
technical lead in weaponry the most plausible reason
explaining satisfactorily military success in battle. For
example, American success in its deployment and employment of Landpower in both the world wars of the
20th century owed relatively little to technological advantage. To understand what happened strategically
in 1918 and then in 1944-45, one needs to look a long
way beyond, and behind, the quality of rival equipment in widespread American use.24 In land warfare,
sheer quantity (of many kinds) can have a quality
all its own. Also, decisions as to how weapons will
be used, and the highly variable facts concerning the
measure of human determination that soldiers will
choose to show under extreme pressure, must fuel uncertainty over relative adversarial performance. Accepting the risk of overstatement, one should endorse
the quite common assumption that performance in
war depends more upon the ways in which weapons
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are used than upon the competitive combat quality of
the weapons themselves—within reason, I must hasten to add, because this can be a dangerous idea to
endorse uncritically and too readily. To lay emphasis,
as we should, upon the superior significance of the
human terrain that is the core of Landpower is not to
suggest or even imply that dimensions other than the
human do not matter in landward conflict.25 But it is
unmistakably clear about the primary importance of
people.26 Strategic Landpower is dominated in historical practice today, as it always has been in the past, by
the human domain.
Presence and Politics.
More often than not in the irregular style of conflict
of the 21st century, the strategic value of U.S. Landpower as local presence can be of greater significance
than its military worth in the armed struggle. There is
a quality of credibility to forward human commitment
not reachable with alternative ways and means. This
is not to deny that American forward local presence
may be akin to a two-edged sword. As a hate object
for the focus of hostile attention, the Western soldier
on the ground in physically and culturally alien terrain is an adversarial gift as a target to the insurgent.
But, if we prove able to raise our game in the field of
cultural tolerance—especially given the fact that we
will be the foreigners, the Other in local terms to some
degree—there is no doubt that the forward deployment of our most highly valued asset, people, carries a message of seriousness of political intent that is
universally persuasive.
The point may seem almost too obvious to be worthy of mention, but it is important that we do not forget that our military behavior is always about politics.
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In the 2000s, we learned and re-learned a great deal
about the domestic politics of Afghan and Iraqi societies, not infrequently as a damaging consequence of
our mistakes. This can be perilously easy to overstate,
but when we intervene in a hugely foreign country,
unless our struggle unavoidably has to be overwhelmingly, not even only primarily, military in nature, we
are bound to become intimate, if relatively ignorant,
players in local political struggles.27 Military readers
should not be dismissive of the point just registered,
because all military endeavor, with its strategic effect,
ultimately has to be about political effect. There can be
no military or strategic consequences that do not have
implications, direct or indirect, for a political narrative. This is not merely an argument, rather is it a definitional truth blessed by an abundance of evidential
material, as well as by the philosophical authority of
Carl von Clausewitz.28 If this were not so, then military performance, successful or otherwise in a battlefield sense, would have to be bereft of meaning.
Military deployment and employment is instrumental for political purpose, or even for cultural purpose that will have political meaning. I am suggesting
that the forward deployment of strategic Landpower
must have unusually intense and probably complicating consequences for the course of local political
events, not least because our knowledge and understanding of the informal structures of power in many
foreign societies is weak or even near absent altogether. When we join the local fight(s) of others, notwithstanding the seriousness of our own policy purpose,
we become active players in violent struggles that have
rules and procedures we are unlikely to comprehend
adequately for a while. I write this not in order to argue a case against foreign intervention, but rather only
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to suggest that the very nature of the human domain
most characteristic of Landpower all but guarantees
that we will need to pay a price in errors committed if
we are to be effective in the human domain particular
to an alien foreign society. Admittedly, there is much
in tactics, and even possibly in operational art, substantially common as sound military practice across
frontiers and cultures. But, even the humble corporal,
who would be “strategic” in a positive sense, needs
to be careful to give the least local offense consistent
with reasonable understanding of his duty.
Contrary to appearances, possibly, what I have just
written is not intended as a warning against foreign
intervention; indeed, if anything, it is an argument
generically supportive of the thesis that Landpower
is, by its very nature, near certain to have a uniquely
strategic effect when forward deployed into an active
theater. There is a Janus-like quality unique to Landpower among the whole range of military domains,
meaning that this particular, most essentially human
kind of military power, has unequalled potential to
yield to us either, even both, extraordinary strategic
advantage and unusually costly and possibly embarrassingly unsuccessful strategic returns. The deployment of our soldiers into harm’s way far abroad should
never be treated merely as a routine matter for policy
and strategy.
Strategic Landpower and Political Territoriality.
Because of the enduring nature of the human domain, every actual, as well as plausibly probable, potential conflict has some territorial definition. Whether
particular tracts of land are sought as objects to own
legally and politically, or are very desirable for their
instrumental value when controlled, there is always
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a territorial dimension to strategic history.29 In its
very nature, Landpower inherently and necessarily is
about land and the resources that exist both in and
on it. While seapower, airpower, cyberpower, and nuclear weapons may have deterrent or coercive merit
as instruments of strategic influence, Landpower is
unique, and indeed essential, as the strategic agent capable of securing and sustaining the political control
of territory and its assets.30 Necessarily as well as obviously, Landpower also is probably uniquely capable
of discouraging, defeating, and punishing adversaries
on land. This argument does not ignore the strategic
utility derivative from joint efforts in support of the
narrative on territorial security, but neither is it confused as to who or what must be in the lead for control
that lasts on the ground.
It is my contention that, as land animals, humans
must and do care most about the land (among all environments). This elementary, indeed simply elemental,
truism explains why Landpower has to be regarded
as the most vitally strategic of all among the military
contenders for highest priority in relative strategic importance. Moreover, it should not escape notice that,
even when behavior at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace looms large and perhaps ominously in public
consciousness of threat, the anxiety thus produced is
translated reflectively into acute concern over landward security. This is unavoidable because all terrestrial concerns need due conversion into analyses
and arguments that bear upon our inalienably territorial approach to, and understanding of, national security. Joint military action in and from geographies
other than the land occasionally will promote concern
or even, in extremis, alarm, but there will always be
some territorial reference or implication that cannot
plausibly be denied for long.
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This monograph now turns to address the joint
context within which Landpower must function
strategically.
JOINTLY ESSENTIAL, BUT ALSO
ESSENTIALLY JOINT
Strategic Landpower is a team accomplishment,
with ground forces providing the most defining of
characteristic capabilities and behaviors. Specifically,
the strategic merit in Landpower derives particularly
from the unique ability of ground forces to secure and
exploit territorial control of natural and human geography. If the United States needs to send coercive
signals, either in warning or in the form of limited but
pain-causing actions, then often it will be sufficient
to confine our coercive behavior to the sky, the sea,
and these days probably also to cyberspace. But, if the
putative inimical menace or harmful deeds that are
our reason for anxiety or hurt are politically intolerable, then a need may be determined for the effecting of change in the local context.31 When a situation
is perceived as requiring alteration of a nonmarginal
kind and is certain to be resisted, with at least some
force applied locally, then the political case for the
deployment of strategic Landpower will be a strong
one. Usually, it will be more than slightly challenging
politically for a President to decide to place American
boots on foreign ground; this is as it should be because
the commitment of Americans to war, or at the least
to a warlike prospect, should never be undertaken
casually and lightly.
It may be worth emphasizing the fact that the
whole context of contemporary warfare is intrinsically and therefore essentially joint in character. Indeed,
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the character of warfare is now so substantially and
necessarily permanently joint that it is appropriate
to understand the jointness of the environments for
conflict as being so stable as to merit its being understood as an integral feature in the nature of modern
conflict. In other words, it is not plausible to anticipate
scenarios for future armed conflict wherein American
ground forces would not need or want to function in
ways enabled by joint effort by a suitable mix of contributions from forces at sea, in the air, in space, and
in cyberspace. Even if and when American ground
forces are overwhelmingly of particular military and
strategic significance, there would be need for support
of various kinds provided by military, and also probably some civilian, elements designed to operate in or
on geography other than the land.
It is not an important demotion of American Landpower to acknowledge that it is not, and cannot be,
synonymous with ground power alone. Co-existing
with the world’s premier navy and air force may be a
budgetary nuisance from time to time, but it is nonetheless a crucially valuable enabler of success for U.S.
Landpower. After all, it should not be unduly challenging to the intellect both to grasp the distinction
between Landpower and ground forces (or power),
and also to recognize the supportive importance of
contributions from the extra-territorial geographical
environments. Similarly, it ought not to be outstandingly difficult to explain that the most essential mission for American Landpower is the occasional vital
need to send American boots to hit foreign ground at
times and also in places not always reliably anticipatable long in advance.
Logistics are always of critical importance to national security, and there are excellent reasons why
logistical competence long has had to be strongly
33

characteristic of what one might chose controversially
to term American ways of war.32 Bluntly stated, if the
American military establishment was not competent
in its ability to meet the logistic needs of its forces, the
country simply could not fight, at least it could not
do so for very long. American geopolitics in several
senses quite literally mandated the logistical marvels
that have been displayed from the 18th to the 21st
centuries. Whatever else may have been less than
competitively excellent about American Landpower
through more than 2 centuries, challenges to supply
and movement almost invariably have been met exceedingly well.33 An important reason for this generally satisfactory strategic condition simply has been,
and remains, American alertness to the implications of
raw distance. Not only does the American homeland
comprise and consist of territory continental in scale,
but global geopolitics located the United States both
comfortably and uncomfortably at oceanic distances
from the territorial heartland of world politics and
strategic history that is and remains Eurasia–Africa.34
The joint dependencies that critically help to enable U.S. Landpower to be strategic are not discretionary, rather they are unavoidable reflections of the facts
of physical, political, military, and therefore strategic
geography. While the dominant ground-force agencies in U.S. Landpower—the Army, Marine Corps,
and Special Forces—may own and thereby control
with maximum authority and legitimacy, specialized
capabilities in fire support, transportation, communications, and intelligence, such particular ancillary
aids do not serve significantly to menace the broad
meaning or nature of Landpower. Often arguably, it
may appear to matter which armed service is primarily responsible for troop conveyance and logistical
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sustenance of both inter- and intra-theater kinds. But
understanding of the nature of strategic Landpower
should not be confused by the color of uniform the
supportive personnel wear in performing essential
joint duty. This is not to attempt to argue foolishly that
political ownership of some particular tasking areas
does not matter. The military tribes and sub-tribes, despite their essential joint commonality, do each have
military cultures that fall short of a perfect match
with those most prevalent among “client” Landpower
combatants on the ground. Experience of and in distinctive combat roles and duties feeds expectations of
support from domains other than the ground that are
not surrendered lightly to those whose military culture is likely to be somewhat alien. The most obvious,
albeit extreme, example of this phenomenon is the
persisting successful determination of the U.S. Marine
Corps to own and provide its essential close air support from its own ranks.35 Marine aircrew are Marines
first and aircrew somewhat later. Joint interdependencies endure and are necessary, but they cannot serve
entirely to obscure the significance of the facts of geophysics. In other words, each geographical (or at least
functional, as with cyber power) domain has to be
respected for its unique qualities.
The narrative of strategic Landpower primarily
must be one dominated by the course of local events
for ground forces. But, notwithstanding military urgency on the ground, provision of joint support from
the air requires a permissiveness of weather conditions that will not always be present reliably when
and where it is most needed. Even assuming goodwill, honest intention, and strong determination, the
facts of diverse geography may reveal rhythms in
feasibility that complicate strategic life for the smooth
conduct of joint enterprises.
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It is well and necessary to remember that a critically important enabling task for joint endeavor is
performed by nuclear-armed elements of the forces.
These forces, specialized and deployed militarily triadically for potential employment from land, air, and
sea (primarily submarines), can play a vital if typically
undepreciated role as a deterrent preventive that enables U.S. Landpower to function successfully strategically. Ever since the mid–1950s, American theorists
have argued about the extended deterrent worth of
nuclear weapons.36 For our purpose here, suffice it to
say that strategic Landpower not infrequently must
carry some risk of triggering a great deal more war
than the country would like. I must hasten to explain
that the nuclear peril may be vitally necessary in order to discourage nuclear escalation on the part of an
adversary, while the latent menace in our nuclear posture should help critically to persuade enemies to desist from doing us harm. We can argue about the risks,
dangers, and potential benefits of nuclear armament,
but there is unlikely to be any clear and definitive
strategic conclusion. However, suffice it to say that
the U.S. nuclear arsenal serves essentially as a joint
enabler for the strategically significant employment
of our Landpower. Of course there are risks, “Those
that live by the sword . . .” and so forth. Nonetheless,
when the American public is invited by rival advocacy
groups to endorse and adopt either a version of “minimum deterrence” or the principal alternative—which
is close to steady state with our existing nuclear posture—it should be encouraged to recognize that in an
increasingly nuclear-armed world, joint performance
by Landpower must have nuclear deterrence as a
literally vital strategic enabler.37
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As the concluding issue for this section, it is important to ask whether or not strategic Landpower should
be thought of as a category of military power that is
approaching its “sell by” date. Not infrequently, the
forward deployment of Landpower, if not actually
obsolescent as a purposeful strategic act in statecraft,
nonetheless has been recognized as so extraordinary a
behavior as to merit policy characterization as a “last
resort.” In his recent book, Reconsidering the American
Way of War, Echevarria claimed plausibly, that “[a]s
the air campaign illustrated [over Kosovo in 1999], the
post-Cold War environment did not necessarily suggest that war itself is a last resort for policy, only that
the use of land power might be.”38 In the decade of
COIN and related behavior, the 2000s, the U.S. Government rediscovered the unique virtues of Landpower as ground power in Afghanistan and then in
Iraq, if only in the numerically austere forms deemed
appropriate by then Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.39
American Landpower committed geopolitically
forward substantially in COIN mode is inherently
hazardous; in good part, the peril reposes in the inexorable and potentially strategically weakening effect of the foreign, indeed alien, features of the societies and cultures with which we engage. However,
although there are lessons to be learned that should
encourage us to be cautious about our ability to help
distant friends and allies resist and defeat insurgency,
it would be a grave error in policy and strategy were
the country to reject any and all missions intended
to thwart irregular insurgents. The American body
politic should remember clearly enough that COIN
was rejected by the armed forces almost mindlessly
as a consequence of denial of the Vietnam experience,
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only to discover that the strategic need for a quality
of Landpower able to cope with this kind of conflict,
alas, had not disappeared. There was much about the
U.S. strategic performance in and over Vietnam that
did serve as an invaluable basket of negative lessons,
but in vital addition, the country could learn much of
positive worth from its protracted adventure there;
a like judgment applies quite clearly to our lengthy
experience(s) in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s
(and a little beyond).
The joint essentiality both of and for Landpower
is not in doubt. We know that policy and strategy are
driven not only by objective happenings abroad, but
also by distinctly subjective political, strategic, and
some astrategic sentiments here at home in the United
States. Because Landpower is so human in personal,
moral, and tangible ways, it is almost uniquely vulnerable to wild swings in what currently is fashionable in “correct” political opinion. When we want
American action to be taken, the most seriously committing of possible behaviors is to dispatch some of
our human military assets. The fact of “our lives” on
the line carries a message of moral as well as political and military seriousness that is unmistakable. All
too obviously, of course, the forward commitment
of our soldiers unavoidably is also to offer a hostage
to strategic fortune. Fashions in political and strategic aspiration and belief come and go, and assuredly
will come again. But the future of U.S. politics and
policy on security is certain to continue to register
as necessary and often dominant role for strategic
American Landpower.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This monograph identifies and advances a fivepoint argument that, in toto, comprises the core of the
case for the healthy maintenance of substantial strategic Landpower. This is not, and cannot be, an original
thesis, because it reflects appreciation registered by
thought and in action over the course of 2 1/2 millennia. That said, it is noticeable how readily people
forget, or perhaps just fail fully to recognize the heart
of the matter with respect to Landpower. In good part,
I suspect rather ironically, a principal reason for some
contemporary failure of understanding is only an
overfamiliarity with our subject here. Apparently, it
is challenging to attempt to have deep and hopefully
authoritative thoughts about a concept that in many
pragmatic ways is and can be treated all but casually
day to day. In this monograph, I have sought to step
around both the pressing tactical and technical issues
of the day, and also to avoid insofar as I was able the
dominant policy-political issues that bear directly
upon the Army’s future. Instead, I have striven to explore the very nature of strategic Landpower both as it
is today and as it should remain tomorrow.
1. Landpower is unique and irreplaceable. One
of the better terse explanations of the nature of Landpower was provided recently by Brigadier (Ret.)
Allan Mallinson of the British Army, when he wrote in
The Times (London): “Only ground troops can ‘smell
the battlefield,’ discriminate and consolidate.”40 It is
important to understand and appreciate the enduring
fact that, among all the variety of armed forces, it is
only ground troops that systematically make personto-person contact with people—foes, friends, and temporarily bystanding neutrals. Only in land warfare is
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contact, even personal contact, made, exploited, and
maintained often to the point of a definitive conclusion. Context and narrative may be gained and appreciated from a distance, via photographs, electronic
surveillance, or even the old-fashioned printed page,
but Mallinson penetrates to the heart of the matter
when he cited the opportunity and ability to “smell
the battlefield.”
There should be no doubt that the danger for a democracy is unique when it decides to deploy its soldiers to foreign lands. However, some of the uniquely
politically entangling dangers that can attend foreign
deployment may have incomparably high merit also.
They provide exactly the personally empirical sources
of comprehension that will only be the product of
first-hand exposure to foreign cultural patterns and
traits. Also, often it is important for the American Soldier not to fade too discreetly into the local natural
or man-made landscape. U.S. political commitment of
concern for an ally’s security typically requires some
visible and tangible strengthening evidence by way of
the human domain in the form of its soldiers.
Also, of course, it ought never to be forgotten that
Landpower by its nature must exert itself upon and
within a geography that nearly always includes a foreign population. The vitally important idea of understanding the human domain necessarily pervades all
aspects of the mission set for Landpower.
2. The human domain is an inclusive concept of
timeless worth. Armed conflicts do not appear on our
policy and strategy horizons in a standard pattern.
That said, as it needs to be, what is standard in and
about conflict of all kinds is the dominant importance
of the human domain. From the most civilian of do-
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mestic politics through to the sharp end of war in its
warfare, the human element always is of decisive importance. Even when the possibility of war seems to
be related to the balance, or more likely the perceived
imbalance, of military strengths between competing
arsenals, one finds that human impulse and sentiment
tend to dominate cool analytics. The relative significance of the human domain may appear to have diminished with the ever higher levels of technological
prowess that characterize international strategic competition, but such a conclusion is inappropriate.
Sometimes we may fool ourselves into believing
that we have achieved the ability to peer into the future with reliable understanding. Such belief is as easy
to understand as, alas, it is always false.41 What we do
know about the future with complete reliability is that
it will be dominated by the free will exercised by often
unpredictable individuals. Civilizations, cultures, nations, tribes, and other groups, may well be anticipated to move strategic history along in earnest pursuit
of particularly favored narratives, but social science
for crowd psychology does not carry high and convincing promise of predictive utility. Athenian historian and (unsuccessful) general Thucydides identified
“fear, honor, and interest” as comprising in the barest
of inclusive summary form the leading motivations
in statecraft. It so happens that what he wrote nearly
2,500 years ago is as true, certainly it is as plausible, today as it was then. Of course, tactical details are nearly
always changing, but at the very elevated level of the
motives behind and within the politics that produce
the policy that needs and sometimes finds expression
in strategy, it is not close to self-evident that our human domain today is very different from that of the
Ancient Greeks. Similarly, when we consider tactics in
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the great stream of time we soon discover that revolutions in weaponry have not and probably cannot result in revolution in the personal peril attending, and
anxiety concerning, combat.
On the readily accessible historical evidence, the
human domain that rules in strategic Landpower in
several senses would appear to be all but permanent.
Changes in the human military condition have been
hugely transformative in appearance, but are far less
impressive when we enquire about the nature of conflict through the ages. The particulars of anxiety, fear,
ambition, and contingent opportunity vary in rich
detail from situation to situation, but as Clausewitz
explained in the most summary of forms: “Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion,
uncertainty, and chance.”42 He proceeds immediately
and deeply into the human domain by arguing that:
If we consider them [the “four elements” immediately above] together, it becomes evident how much
fortitude of mind and character are needed to make
progress in these impeding elements with safety and
success. According to circumstance, reporters and
historians of war use such terms as energy, firmness,
staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character. These products of a heroic nature could almost
be treated as one and the same force–strength of
will–which adjusts itself to circumstances: but though
closely linked, they are not identical.43

It seems unmistakable to this author that Thucydides
and Clausewitz were writing about a phenomenon of
armed conflict common to both of them.
3. Landpower is always strategic. The permanent
nature of Landpower as a strategic instrument and asset does not mean that always it is so regarded. Mili42

tary behavior, the activity or passivity of one’s Army,
cannot help but have strategic meaning. There is no
reason in abstract logic or empirical fact why Landpower’s strategic quality should be questionable. Given that strategy is about the consequences of behavior, pre-planned and intended or not, there is nothing
extraordinary about the claim that Landpower has to
be regarded as a strategic asset. Indeed, this author
is somewhat surprised that many people appear to
be mentally disturbed in their occasional strategic
thinking by the suggestion that Landpower needs to
be thought of as an inherently strategic tool of state.
However, it is one thing to win a philosophical argument on logical merit, but it is quite another to ensure
that that conceptual success influences attitudes and
alters relevant behavior.
A significant part of the challenge facing the idea
and the practice of strategic Landpower lies in what
might be termed the technology overlay that in appearance, at least, seems often to demote the relative
importance of “the man on the scene with the gun.” It
can be difficult to explain to audiences, even to those
containing military specialists, that the outcome to
armed conflict and its warfare typically is not determined as a consequence of competition in technological sophistication. For a contemporary hypothetical
example of argument, we can be sure that there will be
no reliable causal connection between a military’s sophistication in available computers and its prospects
of achieving military and strategic advantage. The
reason for this apparently unreasonable argument is
because strategic performance and its meaning is influenced by so many variables that even a clear advantage in communication technology is unlikely to
be able to compensate for the ill effects of decisions
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in command and tactical performance that prove to
be seriously flawed. In short, technically wonderful
computers cannot rescue a strategic adventure that
seeks to achieve what is politically, culturally, and
possibly even militarily unachievable. This argument
is employed here not for the foolish purpose of casting
doubt on the military and strategic value of excellence
in digital communication, but rather to insist that there
is far more to war and warfare than high technology.
Regarded prudently as an enabler for strategically and
operationally sensible endeavors, there is everything
to be said in praise of reliable advanced computers.
Whatever its reactive technical state when competitively regarded, Landpower unavoidably is always a
strategic instrument. If this fact is not understood, is
disregarded, or is rejected, then the Landpower at issue is likely to be misused as a consequence. The worth
of Landpower as a potential strategic asset must vary
widely according to the constraints and opportunities
allowed by historical circumstance, and somewhat in
keeping with the quality in threat and competitively
in combat displayed and demonstrated by the soldiers. Due recognition as a strategic asset does not
mean automatically and in truth miraculously that
our strategic Landpower must be strategically successful in coercive pursuit of policy ends that ought to
be politically prudent.
4. Strategic landpower is always a joint instrument. Some competition between service organizations and functions is both inevitable and even desirable. It is not unusual for there to be reasonable
sounding and looking grounds for approaching a mission in quite radically alternative ways. The tool bag
of different military capabilities, human and techni-
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cal, typically can offer a range of choice. Provided the
core human function of Landpower is not sidelined
when it really needs to be the central prop for an effort, the feasibility of discretion over ways and means
is thoroughly desirable. Certainly, there should be no
automaticity of Landpower response to a range of scenario needs that do appear to require local American
presence on the ground in question. In point of fact,
there are situations when the politics of forward deployment for U.S. ground forces appear to argue in
favor of only minimal evidence of presence—in which
case, American military assistance from altitude and
probably from beyond the horizon at sea is most
appropriate.
The central purpose of this monograph is to help
ensure that whatever U.S. politics and policy decide
is the most suitable strategic response to some local
or regional crisis, at least there should be no misunderstanding of the benefits, as well as the probable
costs, of Landpower. It is beyond the scope of this
monograph to explore and explain the complex connections among politics, policy, and strategy. But, it
is important to recognize that Landpower inevitably
engages closely either with local politics, or with the
consequences of those politics, in ways that are not
possible for other instruments of our military power.
The strategic function most essentially being about the
consequences of military behavior is not itself political
in nature, but it cannot help being all about politics
nonetheless.
Although the use of Landpower is an exercise in
strategy and not in politics, the landward element
in our joint ventures ensures that we will engage in
contact with local political conditions. Our Sailors and
armies in effect can remain convincingly in America
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in some important senses (e.g., in American “forts” as
operating bases), even when their behavior has local
effect “in country.” The Soldier can be isolated to a degree from local human contact, but we need to remember that personal as well as reputational contact in the
human domain of conflict is literally the most distinguishing of the characteristics potentially uniquely
valuable about Landpower. American policy does not
always desire or require foreign contact and true local
engagement in its strategic commitments, but when it
does, it is necessary that the merit as well as the possible cost of forward deployable Landpower is well
enough understood.
5. The case for strategic Landpower is as old as
strategic history. Finally, it should be appreciated that
the case for strategic Landpower is really as ancient
as all of strategic history in the great stream of time.
Landpower, one might attempt to argue, is no longer
the instrument of final argument of state power, now
that nuclear weapons have become permanent elements in some national arsenals.44 However, the nuclear era was not a decade old before there was quite
general recognition that, although the strategic utility
of those weapons was high, it was also limited in domain. Indeed, contrary to many expectations fueled by
the unsatisfying course and disappointing outcome of
the war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, neither conceptual exploration nor subsequent technical innovation
served helpfully to render nuclear weapons practicably useful as a strategic instrument.
As a necessary consequence of the practical limitations inhibiting the military and strategic value of
nuclear weapons, the United States found itself needing to employ its Landpower as in the days of yore,
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at least with a pretense of nuclear innocence. In other
words, the permanent addition of nuclear weapons to
state arsenals, possibly surprisingly, has had only a
modest effect upon the strategic utility of Landpower.
Of course, Landpower potentially would be sharply
disciplined in its use were it to be employed as threat
or in battle against another nuclear weapon state.
However, Landpower retains much of its strategic
utility, even in a political context influenced by anxieties about nuclear risks and danger. The nuclear dimension to the American joint narrative of military power
for strategic effect is real and occasionally, albeit only
rarely, immediately important. As a general rule, it is
appropriate to consider America’s nuclear arsenal being a joint team player whose usual, though essential,
duty is to keep the nuclear weapons of other states
off the political field of play. With only the blessedly
lonely exception of nuclear weaponry, the whole narrative of strategic history is one demonstrating conclusively the essential continuity in the strategic and
political meaning and relative value of Landpower.
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